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Abstract 
The presentation will focus on the major developments 
in the U.S. scheduled air transport industry both domestic 
and international, together with a brief history of the 
European air transport system. The role and formulation 
of the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, International Civil 
Aviation Organization, and International Air Transport 




.The early development of the commercial air transport 
industry was made possible through government financial support, 
although this support varied in nature and degree from country to 
country. In Europe most of the research and development in early 
aviation was undertaken in one way or another for defense purposes. 
In the United states, since the transportation of mail had always 
been the function of the gOvernment, public funds were justified 
to develop the system. Even the "bush-pilots" in Canada were 
so~ewhat dependent on government support. In general. this 
financial aid consisted of air mail payments, grants for offering 
service on certain routes, outright monetary gifts, aircraft 
development costs, extremely low interest loans to purchase 
aircraft and special depreciation allowances. It was assumed 
that these supports would be temporary and that eventually the 
industry would become self-supporting. 
Prior to the first World War, the United states lagged behind 
Europe in the development of aircraft, with France considered the 
pioneer in design and production of early heavier-than-air aircraft. 
1 
According to one source, at the beginning of the first World War, 
France had 140~ airplanes, Germany 1000, Russia 800, Great Britain 
400, and the United states 23. One explanation for this is the 
amount of military aviatio:l bud'Jet for each of these co'.mtries. 
For example, by 1913 the military aviatio:l budget in France had 
reached almost 7.5 million dollars. while the figllrefor the 
1. CAB Publication - Reference 1. Page 204 
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Jnited states w'~s closer to $125,000. 
Although the history of the cOlnmercial air transport 
Lndustry can be traced back to 1905; apart from some of the 
~xperimental flights and routes, regularly sched'lled air services 
.. ere not offered until 1918 in the U.S. and 1919 in Europe. In 
,eneral, the development of the industry focused o~ the trans-
Jortation of mail in the united states and passengers in Europe. 
rhe U. S. m"dl service wa.s inaugurated on May 15, 1918 on the 
~ew York-Washington route using army equipment and personnel and 
Eive months later the air transport part of the service was taken 
)ver by the post Office Department. The fleet consisted mostly 
Jf war-surplus aircraft with some new aircraft specially built 
for the Post Office Department. By December the service was 
)ffered in the New York - Chicago market and within two years 
transcontinental air mail service was in operation between New York 
and San Francisco with the airplane flying durtng the day only. 
[n Europe, after the war, England, France and Germany, all within 
a few months of each other, started scheduled air services. In 
3ermany Deutsche Luft Reederei began operating a passenger service 
3 
in February 1919 betw;en Berlin and Weimar via Leipzig; in France 
~arman Airli~es started scheduled operations on the Paris-London 
and Paris-Brussels routes; and in England, Aircraft Transport and 
------
2. Miller and Sawers - Reference 2. Page 9. 
3. Davies - Reference 3. Pages 11-20. 
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Travel offered scheduled service in August on the Lo~don­
Paris route. 
The fleets of these early airlines consisted mostly of 
single and twin-engined bombers which were modified to carry 
passengers. The British and the French used the early biplanes 
with capacity ranging from four totw'~lve seats, while the 
Germans used the Junker monoplanes. These aircraft had very 
limited payload capacity, cruising speed and range. By the mid-
twen·c t,~s t:hese early care lers had upgraded the fleets to tri-
motors and development was underway for radial air cooled engines 
which were more powerful and more efficient. 
Since the transportation by air crossed national frontiers, 
a need arose for establishing some principles of international 
law regarding aerial navigation and a state's sovereignty over its 
airspace. The Aeronautical Commission of the Peace Conference 
held in Paris in 1919, established the basic rule of international 
law regarding commercial aviation. This law stated that every 
nation has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace 
above its territory. Although, the united States did not ratify 
this convention, the pan American convention signed in Havana in 
1928 agreed to most of the principles of the Paris convention. 
Also in 1919, six European nations, Denmark, England, Germany, 
Holland, Norway and Sweden, jointly created an organization 
called the International Air Traffic Association, the predecessor 
of the present International Air Transport Association. The 
initial functions of the organization were to clarify international 
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aviation law and to standardize aviation technology. The main 
aim of the member airlines was to standardize the conditions and 
facilities of air travel between their countries. 
The mid-1920's represented a period of consolidation in 
Europe. In many cases the government made consolidation and 
sometimes partial state ownership a necessary condition for 
subsidy. For example, Imperial Airways was incorporated in 
England by merging four separate companies. The Civil Air Trans-
port Subsidies Committee (Rambling Committee) organized in 1923 
recommended that the existing four carriers should be merged 
into one Imperial Airways, partially government owned, which 
received a total subsidy of one million pounds, spread in de-
creasing amounts over a ten year period. 
Expansion to other countries and continents was largely a 
result of the European countries expanding operations within their 
colonial empires. The Belgians, for example, set up services 
in the Congo in 1920. Since the Treaty of Versailles restricted 
the Germans from manufacturing aircraft and operating any German 
international airline, they followed a strategy of setting up 
local operations in various countries around the world, beginning 
with South America. The objective was to initially develop local 
airlines in as many countries as possible and eventually to con-
nect them with a trunk service operating from Germany. using 
this strategy, Germany set up local lines in South America, 
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Eastern and Central Europe, and eventually persia and China. 
Other countries to realize the potential of air transpor-
tation were often the ones with poor communication due to natural 
barriers such as forests, rivers, and mountains, creating a situ-
ation for the establishment of air services. For the most part, 
though, these countries had no aviation industry and exploited 
some tie with those nations who did in order to obtain aircraft 
for their air services. In Australia, mail service was started 
in 1919 on the west coast between Perth and Derby by West 
Australian Airways. The following year Qantas started the mail 
service in the east. By the early twenties, similar service was 
started in Canada, Japan, Latin America, Middle East and South 
Africa. 
In the U.S., while business was not too successful over short 
distances, great opportunities existed for long-haul transportation 
of the mail. This was well demonstrated by the time savings 
produced in an experimental flight from San Francisco to New York. 
taking about 34 hours. By 1924 the transcontinental flight time 
had further been reduced when the operation had been extended to 
include night service. The introduction of more reliable and 
durable engines, radio communication and navigational aids sig-
nificantly improved the reliability of airline operations. Although 
there had been a number of early attempts at regular air passenger 
service in the United States, it was not until 1925 that service 
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was offered on a year-around basis on the Los Angeles-San Diego 
route. The 120 mile trip took an hour and a half and cost $17.50 
one-way or $26.50 round trip. From here on. the passenger traffic 
began to grow rapidly and by 1930. the passenger traffic in the 
united States was about equal to the rest of the world taken 
together. In Europe. Deutsche Lufthansa was the leading air-
line in 1930 having carried well over 100.000 passengers. In 
France in the same year. four airlines put together had carried 
less than fifty percent of the passenger traffic carried by the ( 
German carrier. 
The significant passenger traffic growth resulted in the 
development of larger capacity aircraft. For a long time. however. 
aircraft speed remained around 100 miles per hour. Although. up 
until the late twenties. Europe had maintained the lead in aircraft 
development. the united States took over this leadership in a 
relatively short period. While the total number of aircraft 
produced in the united States in the year 1924 amounted to ap-
proximately 60. the number increased to about 5.500 during 1929. 
The u.S. leadership in aircraft development began with the Ford 
Tri-motor of 1926. continued with the Boeing 247 and received 
world acknowledgement in 1935 with the DC-3. The DC-3 had a 
capacity of 21 passengers and a speed of almost two hundred miles 
per hour. This aircraft revolutionized the air transport industry. 
Due to its much lower direct operating costs. the carriers were 
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able to lower the fares and increase traffic. Miller and Sawers 
show that by the end of 1941, almost 800 DC-3's were delivered 
and over half of these were delivered to the airlines. 
The Post Office Department in the u.s. operated the mail 
flights until 1927 in spite of the fact that protests were heard 
from the railroads in the early twenties regarding governmental 
competition in the transportation of mail. As a result of these 
protests the Air Mail Act of 1925 (Kelly Act) was passed to 
encourage commercial aviation and to transfer the air mail 
transportation operation to private carriers on the basis of 
competitive bids. Initially the contracts were awarded for 
four-year periods. Under competitive bidding the most significant 
contracts were awarded to Boeing Air Transport for the San 
Francisco-Chicago route and to National Air Transport for the 
New York-Chicago route. The transcontinental route was linked 
by about a dozen feeder routes such that almost every major city 
in the united States was linked on the air mail system. 
The problem in the united States during this time period 
was that the mail revenues were too low to justify capital expense 
for better equipment. Poor equipment, on the other hand, resulted 
in poor, service which in turn led to even lower revenues. Part 
of the unwillingness of the carriers to invest in new equipment 
resulted from the fear of losing mail contracts and the lack of 
adequate passenger traffic. The carriers needed some government 
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backing and the public needed assurance that air transportation 
was safe, fast and within their means. 
There were four major factors which encouraged the deveiop-
ment of the U.S. air transport industry at this very critical 
time. First, the Air Commerce Act of 1926 initiated the 
development by the federal government of civil airways, navigational 
aids, and provided for the regulation of safety. This Act, 
therefore, relieved the private carriers from heavy investments 
in ground facilities for air navigation. Second, Charles 
Lindbergh's transatlantic flight proved to be very timely in 
stimulating the early development of the air passenger market. 
Third, the Daniel Guggenheim Fund enabled an experiment to 
operate a "model airline" to encourage the development of pas-
senger traffic, which was sometimes considered as a financial 
liability. Fourth, the Kelly Act was amended to include pro-
visions whereby the original four year mail contracts could be 
extended to ten years, thereby promoting increased investment in 
the industry. 
During this time period, most of the airlines in the world 
were still dependent on government subsidies. Again according to 
the research of Miller and Sawers, the French airlines received 
the highest amount of government financial support. In 1928 
only ten percent or so of the airline revenues came from com-
mercial operations. In Germany Lufthansa's commercial operations 
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accounted for roughly 30 percent of the total income. The 
data on the exact amount of subsidy by country are not readily 
available. Estimates are available, however, for the development 
costs of the air mail transportation system in the United states. 
4 
According to Warner's research, the United states government 
paid roughly ten million dollars for developing the early trans-
port system. This estimate is based on a total government ex-
penditure of roughly $17.5 million for the nine year period from 
1918 to 1927, while Warner estimated the income for this period 
to be roughly $7.5 million based on the real value of inventory 
and capital items in hand and the receipts for postage during 
the nine year period. 
In the summer of 1927, Juan Trippe, who was connected with 
Colonial Airways at the time, learned that the Post Office Depart-
ment was considering an air mail contract between Key West, Florida 
and Havana, Cuba. There were two carriers in operation in Florida, 
pan American and Florida Airways and neither of these two com-
panies had the necessary financial backing or the equipment to 
negotiate the contract for the transportation of mail between Cuba 
and the United states. Although Pan American had acquired a con-
tract from the Cuban government to fly the mail between the U.s. 
and Cuba, the company did not, however,possess the landing rights. 
4. Warner - Reference 4. Page 29 
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Trippe flew over to Havana and negotiated an exclusive flying 
permit between the U.S. and Cuba, ensuring that only Pan Am 
could operate on this route. 
In 1928, the Foreign Air Mail Act was passed authorizing the 
Postmaster General to award contracts for the transportation of 
mail by air to foreign countries and territorial possessions of 
the united States. The carrier selected to offer foreign air mail 
services was Pan American. Since Pan American had already acquired 
the necessary landing privileges in other Latin American countries, 
virtually all of the foreign air mail contracts were awarded to 
the company at the highest rate permissible under the Act. 
Initially the U.S. government did not negotiate the develop-
ment of the international routes with these Latin American nations. 
Pan American on its own initiative went ahead and made private 
agreements with these foreign nations for landing rights in their 
country and since Pan American was not in a position to offer 
exchange landing rights, the agreements were made without reciprocal 
landing rights in the united States. With mail payments authorized 
by the Foreign Air Mail Act of 1928, and with exclusive landing 
rights, Pan American showed rapid development. 
Although passenger travel was growing fairly rapidly by the 
end of the twenties, prior to 1929, there was no uniform law 
regarding the rights of the passengers, ownership of freight, or 
liability of the carriers. In 1929, an International Diplomatic 
Conference on Private Air Law was held in Warsaw, poland 
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to establish the law regarding the liability of the airlines 
in international air transportation, towards their passengers and 
cargo in the event of an accid2nt. The result of this was the 
Warsaw Convention, which initially limited the carriers' liability 
to $8,300 for each passenger. The limit on the liability was 
doubled by the Hague Protocol of 1955 and further increased to 
$75,000 by the Montreal Agreement of 1966. 
In the united states, the Air Mail Act of 1925 was once 
again amended in 1930 (now called the MCNary-Watres, or Watres 
Act). This Act authorized the exchange of air mail contracts 
for air mail route certificates with further authority to extend 
or consolidate routes. Furthermore, the Act authorized payment 
for the transportation of mail based on space available and 
distance flown rather than the mail load carried. 
It has been said that the Postmaster General, Walter Brown 
was the chief planner of the Watres Act. He wanted to restructure 
the industry from a random assortment of short unconnected mail 
routes to a stable integrated nationwide airline system. He 
intended to expand passenger services and establish a self-
sufficient air transport industry. His plan was to set up three 
major transcontinental routes coordinated and integrated with 
several feeder routes. Brown felt that the smaller companies were 
under capitalized and nearly all of them completely dependent 
upon the government contracts for their survival. He was con-
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vinced that the salutian was to. eliminate cempetitive bidding 
and to. use the mail pay to. suppart the carriers wham he censidered 
streng eneugh to. centribute to. the develepment ef cammercial 
aviatien. 
He was able to. achieve this by first awarding mail cantracts 
to. the lewest bidder who. shewed a daily aperatian fer a peried ef at 
least six menths aver a reute ef 250 miles in length and, secendly, 
threugh extensien ar censelidatio.n ef reutes which in his epinien 
were in the public interest. The previsien previding the sub-
stitutien ef mail centracts fer ten-year reute certificates had 
already been in existence. The extensian and censelidatien 
pravisian allawed the establishment ef majar transcentinental 
reutes. Finally, the ferm ef payment represented an indirect 
subsidy which enabled the carriers to. purchase and aperate larger 
aircraft and develep the passenger market. Mail centracts were 
nat necessarily awarded to. the lawest bidder because there was 
no. guarantee that the lewest bidder wauld be able to. survive the 
cut-threat campetitian. Hewever, cases when a cantract was given 
to. a larger carrier aver a smaller carrier the larger carrier was 
ebliged to. buy eut the smaller carrier at a "fair" price. 
Semewhat similar develepments were taking place in Eurape. 
Far example, the Empire Air Mail Scheme which included previsians 
that all mail dispatched to. er frem these parts ef the British 
Cemmanwealth served by Imperial Airways wauld autamatically be 
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carried by air. This scheme enabled Imperial to intensify 
the services and capacity it offered in the knowledge that 
much of its payload was guaranteed. On this basis, Imperial 
Airways introduced faster aircraft with more frequent service. 
This program provided the carrier with sUbstantial subsidy for 
development in addition to reimbursement for the costs of trans-
porting mail. 
During early 1933, charges were made against Brown for 
collusion, illegal administration and unfair mail awards. A 
special investigating committee was set and hearings began in 
September 1933. Although during the investigation it became 
clear, among other things, that almost all of the mail contracts 
were awarded to three carriers, some writers claim that the invest-
igation did not probe deeply into the causes of Brown's actions 
or the sincerity of his national plan. The result of the invest-
igation was that the President cancelled all mail contracts 
held between the post Office Department and the private carriers. 
The Army Air Corps was asked to fly the mail. Severe weather 
and flying over unknown routes caused some fatal accidents with 
about a dozen deaths in the first few weeks. As a result of 
this the transportation of the mail was curtailed and finally 
came to a standstill in June, 1934. 
The Air Mail Act of 1934 set up a threefold control of the 
air transport industry in the United States. The air mail contracts 
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were to be awarded by the Post Office Department. The Interstate 
Commerce Commission was put in charge of setting "fair and reason-
able" rates for the transportation of air mail and the Bureau of 
Air Commerce in the Department of Commerce was made responsible 
for the regulation of safety. Under this Act, mail contracts were 
to be awarded on the basis of competitive bidding. Furthermore, 
the carriers involved in the previous "collusion" charges could 
not be awarded the contracts, a stipulation which caused the 
carriers to change their corporate names. In addition, the Act 
made holding companies illegal and, therefore, separated the histor-
ical affiliation between the major airlines and the aircraft manu-
facturers. Finally, the Act also established a five-man Federal 
Aviation Commission to study and recommend future aviation policy 
for the Federal Government. The most important recommendation of 
this commission was that a single independent agency should be 
created to regulate civil aviation. 
Meanwhile, on the international scene, the determination of 
landing rights at foreign ports was still the responsibility of 
the carrier, and Trippe with his position secure in Cuba, had 
been negotiating exclusive landing rights from the governments of 
the other Latin-American nations. A decision was made to offer 
flying boat services based out of Miami and this became the gate-
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way to the Caribbean and Latin America. The use of flying 
, 
boats had two definite advantages: First, whereas airports 
were scarce, sheltered bodies of water were. plentiful; and 
second, the flying boats seemed to provide' a measure of safety 
in case of a forced landing at sea. 
Pan American expanded very aggressively through outright 
purchase of local airlines or companies if it proved necessary 
commercially and/or legally. For instance, having won rights to 
the Caribbean, Pan American proceeded to expand service to the 
west coast of South America and to Argentina. This was achieved 
through the formation of Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc., 
(Panagra) of which Pan American held 50 percent of the stock and 
w. R. Grace, the steamship company held the other 50 percent of 
the stock. The firm W. R. Grace and Company ran ships, banks, 
warehouses, stores, and dominated almost the entire economy on the 
west coast of South America. From the political and economic 
points of view, this proved to be a great asset for Pan Am's 
expansion. There were certain other advantages to the formation 
of Panagra, for example, the Grace Line steamers provided the 
radio weather service needed for air transportation. Similar 
acquisitions of airlines gave Pan American a dominance in Latin 
America. 
Negotiations for the North Atlantic route had begun as early 
as 1929 resulting in preliminary agreements to offer service twice 
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a week between the united states and England. However, the 
British insisted that Pan American could not offer the service 
until such time when a British carrier could also offer similar 
service. Since the British did not possess an appropriate com-
mercial aircraft capable of flying the North Atlantic, service 
was delayed. In the meantime, Trippe involved himself with 
establishing service on the Pacific. Survey flights were made 
as early as 1931. While the northern Great Circle route 
(Seattle-Alaska-Siberia-Japan) required landing permission from 
Russia and Japan, the central-Pacific route contained fueling 
points which were American possessions. The mid-Pacific route 
linked San Francisco and Manila via Hawaii, Midway, Wake and 
Guam. In October 1935, Pan American received the trans-Pacific 
mail contract for service from San Francisco to Manila (Philippines). 
The service was extended to passengers in 1936 and in 1937 the 
route was expanded to Hong Kong. By 1940, Pan Am had also ex-
panded its trans-Pacific route from Hawaii to New Zealand and 
Australia. 
On the u.S. domestic scene, the air transport industry was 
passing through a state of ruinous competition. Some carriers 
were submitting ridiculously low bids to obtain the air mail 
contracts and routes. Many of the smaller carriers could not bid 
against the giants, and public investment was beginning to shrink. 
Legislation was needed to financially stabilize the' industry by 
providing control of competition, assurance of the operation of 
the carrier, and an end to the confusion of responsibility 
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through the establishment of a single regulatory agency. 
The civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 placed the development, 
regulation and control of air carriers under the jurisdiction 
of a single independent administrative body later known as the 
Civil Aeronautics Board. This Act broadened the scope of safety 
regulation and subjected the airlines to economic regulation. 
The regulation of the industry was performed with "public interest" 
and "public convenience and necessity" as main considerations. 
The major functions of the CAB were to approve passenger fares, 
freight and mail rates, certificate carriers, monitor competition, 
and approve mergers and subsidies. 
Under the "grandfather" clause of the Civil Aeronautics Act 
of 1938, 16 remaining airlines were given permanent certificates 
of convenience and necessity for routes which each of them 
possessed at the date of adaptation of the Act. The Board also 
certificated the Railway Express Agency as an indirect air carrier 
with exemptions from the economic provisions of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act. The nonscheduled carriers were not required to have 
certificates of public convenience and necessity and were also 
exempt from economic regulation by the Board. 
Pan American introduced the first regular scheduled mail 
service on the Atlantic in May 1939, between New York, Lisbon and 
Marseilles. One month later a similar mail service was offered 
to England via Newfoundland and Ireland and in July of 1939 
passenger service was opened to both countries. The transatlantic 
crossing took approximately 29 hours using the Boeing 314 flying 
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boat. The British began a similar service in August. Initially, 
the passenger fare was set at $375 one way or $675 round trip. 
By 1940, the U.S. government's policy towards exchanging 
landing rights had changed. The landing privileges on international 
airports were to be negotiated by the Department of State and 
subject to presidential approval. The CAB was to decide as to 
which United States carrier should be authorized to operate the 
negotiated routes. This, in essence, put an end to Pan American's 
monopoly on negotiating and operating exclusive landing rights. 
with the beginning of World War II, pan American's projected 
expansion came to a halt. The U.S. government took over the trans-
atlantic operations with Pan American and American Export Airlines 
being the sole operators. Regular schedules were maintained on 
the Atlantic and the Pacific. Furthermore, a lot of the aircraft 
belonging to the U.S. domestic airlines were either purchased or 
leased by the government. With very few aircraft left in their 
hands, the carriers were forced into more efficient operations 
and greater utilization from their fleet on restricted routes 
which received service. Most of the airlines began to show 
profit during the war years due, basically, to high load factors, 
high utilization of equipment and elimination of discount fares 
such as for round trips and those offered to credit card holders. 
During the War normal airline operations were curtailed 
throughout Europe due to shortage of equipment or enemy action. 
- 19 -
, 
Passenger traffic dropped to about a third of the level achieved 
in 1939. Britain's air transport industry felt a very severe 
impact. The routes of BOAC had to be restructured completely: 
the Empire Route had to by-pass Europe and the North Atlantic 
service was discontinued while the carrier concentrated in keeping 
open critical lines of communication. The airlines of Allied 
countries were cooperative in transporting government officials, 
military personnel and supplies. In Germany Lufthansa's commercial 
operations were ended abruptly. 
The War was responsible for the rapid technical and operational 
development of transport aircraft. Many refinements were intro-
duced to the aircraft which were in existence prior to the War. 
Aircraft introduced during the War period such as the DC-4 and 
the Lockheed Constellation possess higher payload capacity, range 
and speed. Other areas where refinements were introduced rapidly 
included radio communication, navigational aids, instrument flying 
and airport facilities. 
Towards the end of the war, many nations were interested in 
formulating a universal international air transport pOlicy with 
regard to commercial air rights and in establishing rules governing 
technical and navigational aspects. In 1944, at the invitation 
of the United States, 54 nations sent their representatives to 
the Chicago Conference to formulate universal international air 
transport policy for international travel and commerce. Due to 
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the conflicting interests of the various nations present at the 
conference, an agreement was not reached to provide a means for 
exchanging commercial rights to fly in and out of independent nations. 
Basically, there were two conflicting views-- one of relatively com-
plete competitive freedom desired by the u.s. having the aircraft, 
experience, and finances to dominate such a state of affairs; and the 
other of rather heavily regulated operations supported by most other 
nations in their poor economic state following the War and fearing 
5 just such a U.S. dominance from which they might never escape. The 
British wanted to set up an international agency to control capacity, 
frequency and fares. The routes were to be assigned through bilateral 
agreements. The Americans, on the other hand, agreed that the routes 
should be negotiated through bilateral agreements, but the internation-
al agency should perform a consultative function only with respect to 
economic regulation. Instead they suggested, the agency should be re-
stricted to control the technical side of the air transportation. 
The outcome of the Conference was an establishment of the Inter-
national Air Services Transit Agreement and the Provisional Internat-
ional civil Aviation Organization (PICAO). The former agreement allow-
ed civil aircraft of the signatories to (a) fly across another nation's 
territory (if the nation was a participant to the agreement) without 
landing and (b) land for non-commercial purposes. The function of 
PICAO was to coordinate the activites of the nations signing any agree-
ment made at the Chicago Conference. 
5. See Robert Thornton - Reference 5 
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This organization was also to act as an arbitrator in case of 
conflicts between the various member states. PICAO, however, 
did not possess any economic powers to be applied to the inter-
national air transport industry. 
In 1945, the International Air Transport Association (lATA) 
was formally established at Havana, Cuba. This organization super-
seded the original one formed in 1919. Unlike the old organization, 
the principal function of the new lATA was to control rates on 
international routes. There are no provisions for controlling 
capacity or frequency. The extent of capacity was to be nego-
tiated in the bilateral agreements. In addition, some of the 
functions of the old lATA were still to be performed by the new 
lATA. The two most important provisions in the functioning of 
lATA with regard to controlling fares are: (1) a pro~osed tariff 
has to be approved unanimously by all the members (2) the approved 
tariff is still subject to the approval of the aeronautical 
agency of each of the member nations, which would be affected by 
the proposed tariff. 
Since the Chicago Conference did not result in an agreement 
to decide on a means of exchanging commercial rights, representa-
tives from Great Britain and the united States met in Bermuda in 
1946 to exchange operating rights between the two nations. The 
Bermuda Agreement resulted in the famous "five freedoms" of the 
air. The first two freedoms were essentially agreed at the 
Chicago conference, namely to fly across and to land for non-
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commercial purposes in another nation's territory. The remaining 
freedoms are: to disembark passengers and cargo in a foreign 
country which originated in the carrier's horne country; to pick 
up passengers and cargo from a foreign country destined for the 
carrier's horne country; to transport passengers and cargo from 
one foreign country to another foreign country. The freedom 
classification is based on the origin and destination of the 
passenger and the nationality of the airline and not the pas-
senger. For instance, a Canadian in London boarding a flight 
to Rome is a third freedom on a British carrier, fourth freedom 
on an Italian carrier and fifth freedom on a U.S., Canadian or 
a French carrier. 
Most countries were in favor of the Bermuda type of agree-
ment for exchanging international traffic rights for commercial 
civil aviation. The terms of the original Bermuda Agreement 
between the united Kingdom and the United States are fairly 
liberal. For example, the agreement did not include provisions 
for restricting frequencies or number·of carriers of either country. 
Since then, however, the policies of countries have changed. For 
instance, in 1966, a special bilateral agreement was signed be-
tween the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to provide service between New 
York and Moscow. This agreement is different in format from the 
usual Bermuda type, since it contains provisions on the number of 
frequencies that may be operated between the two countries 
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as well as a designation of the carrier which may operate these 
flights. 
In international operations, a country may sometimes designate 
two or more national carriers to offer parallel services on a 
given route. The united states has authorized this type of 
designation on the North Atlantic. London is served, for example, 
by National, Pan Am, TWA, and Seaboard, the all-cargo carrier. 
The decision for multi-designation on an international route 
involves many factors, such as density of the route, the extent 
of traffic generated by each country, the market share of the 
carriers of each country, fifth freedom traffic, national interest, 
etc. While some of these factors are market related and based 
on simple economics, others are of a political nature and as such 
very difficult to evaluate. 
After the War, Pan American was a strong promoter of the 
"chosen instrument" concept. Under this concept, all international 
services were to be operated by a single carrier. Again the con-
cept involves many factors such as prestige, defense, public 
interest, competition with subsidized carriers, the value of the 
market, etc. In the united States, the Civil Aeronautics Board, 
however, favored competition. As early as 1942, American Export 
Airlines (a shipping company) was awarded a temporary certificate 
to offer transatlantic service. The Board justified this by 
saying that an additional carrier would improve the service and 
serve as a yardstick for comparison of costs. Soon after the war, 
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Pan American was given further competition when another u.s. 
carrier, TWA, and a number of foreign flag carriers were author-
ized to offer scheduled service on the North Atlantic. 
with expansion of routes, excess capacity, and heavy 
investment committed in larger and faster aircraft, the u.s. 
domestic air transport industry was facing economic crisis in 
1948. The scheduled carriers were facing another problem, that 
of competition from the nonscheduled carriers which came into 
existence at the end of the War. These nonscheduled operations 
were started by ex-military personnel who purchased the war-
surplus aircraft. The Board exempted these nonscheduled carriers 
from the economic regulation to carry passengers and/or property 
in the case of domestic operations and property only in the case 
of international operations on selected heavy traffic routes. 
The Board's exemption was based on the assumption that the service 
provided by these carriers would supplement the scheduled carriers. 
In order to improve the economic situation of the industry, the 
Board authorized high mail rates. This was supplemented by 
larger passenger traffic growth due to the introduction of lower 
fares, partly a result of the economics of larger and faster 
aircraft and partly due to management initiative in introducing 
differential pricing mechanisms such as coach-type service and 
family fare plans. 
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The other line of development in the aviation industry after 
the War, was the air freight. Although, in the united states 
the history of air freight dates back to 1930 when many companies 
made arrangements with the Railway Express Agency to transport 
packages on regularly scheduled flights, it was not until 1945 
that all-freight airlines came into existence. In 1947, the Board 
permitted ten all-cargo carriers to offer scheduled air freight 
transportation on a non-certificated basis. By 1949, six of 
these had declared bankruptcy and the remaining four were issued 
temporary certificates of public convenience and necessity to 
perform scheduled service. 
There are four other types of u.s. air carriers which need 
some explanation. First, there were carriers such as Alaska and 
Hawaiian Airlines which were located in the u.s. overseas ter-
ritories. Since Hawaii and Alaska did not enter the Union until 
1959, and for other reasons of special operating rights with 
respect to other U.s. airlines, these carriers were not classified 
under the category of domestic. Even tOday they are classified 
as Intra-Alaska or Intra-Hawaii carriers and both carriers possess 
the Board's permanent route certificates. Secondly, after the 
War, there was yet another category of carriers called the intra-
state carriers. The operations of these carriers were restricted 
to within state borders and regulated by the state's Public 
utilities Commission. These carriers were exempt from the Board's 
regulations. Third, in 1952, the CAB authorized a group of small 
- 26 -
irregular carriers to offer service between communities not 
served by scheduled airlines to points receiving scheduled air-
line service. These carriers, called the air-taxi operators or 
commuter carriers in their scheduled form, offering service with 
aircraft weighing less than 12,500 pounds were also exempt from the 
Board's Economic Regulations. 
The fourth category of carriers consisted of the helicopter 
air service operators. The Helicopter Air Service Program started 
in the united States after the War with subsidies to helicopter 
carriers in a few major cities for the carriage of mail. until 
1953, the three United States helicopter carriers carried no 
passengers at all and their sole source of transport revenue was 
from mail. In the early years the subsidy exceeded overall trans~ 
port revenues, but as passenger traffic increased, it passed sub-
sidy levels by 1964. The subsidy was completely cut off by the 
end of 1965 and the major trunk airlines were persuaded to supply 
financial aid to the helicopter carriers. Since most of the heli-
copter passengers were airline connecting passengers, the rationale 
for this action lay in offering better services for the airline 
passengers with the costs to be borne by the profits of the trunk-
line industry. 
In Europe, BEA and Sabena made significant inroads in the 
development of helicopter service. BEA started the scheduled 
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helicopter passenger service in 1950. Over the years, many 
routes were tried on an experimental basis and most of these 
proved to' be unprofitable because of excessive costs. Although 
Sabena was far more successful in its helicopter passenger service, 
the carrier had to curtail the operations for economy and other 
non-market reasons. The year 1958 was a boom year when,due 
largely to the Brussels World Fair,the helicopter services 
carried over 50,000 passengers and an additional 65,000 sight-
6 
seeing passengers over Brussels. 
By October of 1951, ten domestic trunk carriers had gone 
off federal subsidy. For those still receiving subsidy, the CAB 
announced that a separation should be made between service mail 
payments and subsidy mail payments. For the Big Four trunks 
American, Eastern, TWA, and United, the Board established a 
domestic service mail rate of 45 cents per ton-mile. Four years 
later the Board developed a uniform service mail rate structure 
called "multi-element rate formula." This was a two part rate 
structure consisting of a line haul charge per mail ton-mile 
and a terminal charge per pound of mail enplaned, varied according 
to the class of station served. 
In Europe, after the war, the air transport industry grew 
very rapidly. Most of the route network consisted of pairs of 
airlines enjoying third and fourth freedom rights and even today 
6. World Airline Record - Reference 6, page 205. 
" 
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there are usually only two dominant airlines on any given city-
pair. until about 1950. there was heavy competition between 
the two carriers. This was considered wasteful rivalry and was 
gradually eliminated and replaced on many routes by a system of 
commercial agreements between the airlines. generally known as 
pool agreements. pool agreements generally tend to reduce com-
petition and provide the carriers with high equipment and personnel 
utilization as well as high load factors. Economics can result 
through more uniform scheduling instead of "bunching" flights at 
peak demand periods. It is claimed by some that pooling agree-
ments provide the passenger with a more uniform service at a 
lower price. This is debatable. The terms of the agreement can 
include sharing of revenue. capacity. costs. and can also include 
joint marketing studies. promotion and sale. etc. The extent of 
the agreement varies from carrier to carrier and the agreements 
are usually tied to the national agreements between the respective 
7 
countries. According to the Edwards Report. BEA for example. 
earns roughly 60 percent of its total revenue fvom commercial 
agreements. These agreements are not necessarily restricted to 
intra-European operations. For instance. the "Kangaroo" route 
which links England with India and Australia is operated through 
a tripartite agreement between BOAC. Qantas and Air India. The 
7. Edwards Report - Reference 7. Page 95. 
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distribution of revenue is based on a sophisticated formula 
which takes into account traffic on the various segments as 
well as the connecting traffic at various points. 
These pool agreements generally apply only to the third and 
fourth freedom traffic. Within Europe ~ifth freedom traffic is 
generally limited. There is yet another type of traffic called 
cabotage. This refers to the transportation of passengers by a 
foreign carrier between two cities in the territory of one state 
or its dependencies. For instance, BOAC carrying passengers 
originating at New York to Los Angeles would be referred to as 
cabotage traffic. Another example of this would be for Pan Am 
to carry traffic originating in London to Bermuda. The German 
internal service operated by foreign carriers is sometimes 
confused with cabotage traffic; here however, the peace treaty 
Which followed West Germany regaining its sovereignty prohibited 
Lufthansa from offering service to West Berlin and this service 
was offered by Air France, BEA and Pan Am. This is not cabotage 
traffic. However, there were some other routes within West 
Germany which were operated by the foreign carriers, which was 
cabotage and is now practically non-existent. 
A large number of the scheduled airlines, with the exception 
of the United States air carriers, are partially or wholly owned 
by their governments. The extent of government ownership can 
range from a small percentage as in the case of Finnair (about 
6 percent) to a complete control as in the case of BOAC, Qantas, 
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Air Canada, Air India, etc. Presently, out of the 107 lATA 
member carriers, 37 are completely privately-owned and forty are 
completely state-owned. Table 1 shows the extent of state owner-
ship for the lATA member carriers. 
The reasons for public ownership vary from political philosophy 
to market related factors. In England, for example, one reason 
for nationalization of the airlines was that these carriers were 
unable to compete with the subsidized foreign carriers. The 
size of the carrier is usually not the reason for public owner-
ship; it is also important to keep in mind that private ownership, 
in the case of an international airline still involves government 
participation for at least two reasons. First, the carrier can 
prove to be a very useful element of national defense, and 
second, the carrier needs the government to negotiate bilateral 
agreements with other nations for landing rights. 
Some analysts have attempted to find the relationship between 
government ownership and profitability. So far there is no 
conclusive evidence that government ownership leads to inefficient 
operations, lower profitability, etc. In fact, several govern-
ment owned airlines have consistently shown profitable operations. 
In most cases, complete or partial public ownership also does not 
imply that these carriers exist solely to provide social services, 
carry the national flag, receive protection from competition and 
pay very little attention to the cost of providing the service. 
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In many cases the nationalized airlines are eventually expected to 
pay their own way. 
Joint ownerships are quite common in the airline industry. For 
example, in 1946, TWA acquired a 35 percent common stock interest in 
the Greek Company, Technical and Aeronatuical Exploitations. in exchange 
for financial and technical assistance. In the same year, BEA held 
30 percent interest in Alitalia. There are many reasons for holding 
financial interests in other airlines. These can range from pure 
commercial investment reasons to obtaining feeder traffic. developing 
new routes, and establishing an outlet for retired aircraft. 
The establishment of airlines in many of the smaller or less 
developed countries was strongly influenced by non-economic or non-
market factors. In many cases, the airlines were supported by the 
government for reasons such as national prestige and national defense. 
On the economic grounds, these international services are usually 
justified for such reasons as earning foreign exchange and developing 
tourism. In many cases the development of these airlines was enhanced 
significantly by the foreign aid through agencies such as the United 
states Export-Import Bank, I CAD , World Bank, A.I.D., etc. The United 
States, for instance. has provided low interest loans to purchase 
united states manufactured aircraft. Some of 
- 33 -
the European countries have also provided similar sort of aid in 
the past. Besides financial aid, the airlines of these less 
developed nations have been given support in areas such as pilot 
training, technical services, management consultation, etc. The 
benefits gained by the nations providing aid and the airlines 
providing support have been mentioned previously. 
By the mid-1950's, the airline industry in the united States 
could be considered as established. In 1955, the CAB granted 
permanent certificates of public convenience and necessity to 
the local carriers. TWO years later, the CAB was authorized to 
guarantee loans to assist carriers to purchase flight equipment. 
The amount of loan was limited to 5 million dollars per carrier 
and maximum of 90 percent of the loan could be guaranteed. The 
following year, new legislation was introduced permitting the 
subsidized air carriers to retain profits from the sale of flight 
equipment on the conditions that the profits were reinvested in 
new equipment within a reasonable period of time. 
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 amended and replaced the 
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. The safety rule making function 
was transferred to the newly created Federal Aviation Agency, 
while the regulation of civil aircraft accidents still remained 
the responsibility of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Parallel 
developments in streamlining the regulatory aspects of air 
transportation were taking place in many other countries of the 
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world. For instance, Britain's civil Aviation (Licensing) Act of 
1960 established the Air Transport Licensing Board to approve app-
lications for operating licenses and regulate domestic fares in the 
united Kingdom. 
The type of regulation applied to the airlines in the united 
, 
states should not be taken as typical. For instance, the Austral-
ian civil air transport policy has been quite unique. presently 
the Australian airline industry is basically made up of three air-
lines: Qantas, a public-owned carrier operating international ser-
vices onl~ and two competitive domestic airlines, a private corpor-
ation called Ansett Airlines and a government-owned carrier called 
Trans-Australia Airlines. Under the civil Aviation Agreement of 
1957 and the Airlines Equipment Act of 1958, the government not 
only controls competition, but exercises a tight control on the 
commercial management decisions. For example. neither TAA or An-
sett can purchase a new aircraft without the specific approval of the 
government, while each carrier is also supposed to inform the other 
of its decisions to purchase new equipment. The approval is granted 
if the regulatory authority considers that the new equipment will 
not result in excess capacity or produce a competitive edge for 
one of the carriers. In case of excess capacity, the authority 
can force the carrier(s) to review their fleets. 
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Although, research and development of the jet engine was well 
under way during and even prior to World War II, it was not until 
1952 that the public was offered commercial jet service by BOAC 
(which, unfortunately had to be withdrawn shortly after for technical 
reasons.) In 1956 the Russians introduced the TU-l04. The year 
1958 is, however, referred to as the "jet revolution" year when Pan 
American introduced the Boeing 707 on the North Atlantic, in Octo-
ber 1958, three weeks after BOAC introduced the second version of 
their jet, the DeHavilland Comet 4. For almost a full year there 
were no other competitors on the North Atlantic with jet aircraft 
until September and November of 1959 when QANTAS and TWA introduced 
the Boeing 707's. On the domestic side, National Airlines was the 
first to offer jet service in the united states, on December 1958, 
the carrier offered jet service on the New York-Miami route with 
a B-707 leased from Pan American Airways. A month later American 
put in a 707 on the transcontinental route, TWA entered the market 
in March, and united intrOduced the DC-8 in september of 1959 on 
this route. 
Up to this point, the emphasis has been upon scheduled ser-
vices, domestic and international, however of increasing importance 
has been the development of mass travel on non-scheduled or charter 
services due to the lower fares relative to scheduled services. 
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The scheduled air services have catered to this demand through ex-
cursion fares and other forms of differential pricing, however the 
lower costs obtainable through non-scheduled air travel have resulted 
in a tremendous growth in this form of air transportation. 
The growth of non-scheduled air carriers started after World 
War II on both sides of the Atlantic, dependent largely upon the 
carriage of military cargo and troops for their survival. However 
before long the European carriers began to vigorously promote civil-
ian commercial operations, in particular the inclusive tour charter. 
In an inclusive tour charter, a travel agent produces a "complete 
package" containing air travel, hotel <;l.ccommodations, ground trans-
portation, etc. and by arranging schedules to ensure full plane loads, 
the operators are able to offer packages at a c~nsiderably lower price 
compared to the price of air travel on scheduled carriers. By open-
ing the air travel market to the lower income groups, the charter 
operators were able to achieve tremendous growth rates. 
Prodded by the tremendous demand and realizing the economic 
importance of tourism, the European States formulated a Multilat-
eral Agreement on Commercial Rights of Non-Scheduled Air Services 
in Europe at Paris in 1956. This agreement greatly facilitated the 
growth of inclusive tour travel between the 19 signatories, while 
attempting to protect their scheduled services. 
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The low price of the lTC's allowed the lower income workers in North-
ern Europe to holiday in the sunny South, with air travel to and from 
the resorts making such a vacation possible within the short time 
periods available to them. A number of combining factors meant that 
the united States was much slower in responding to this development 
and lTC's were not permitted until the mid-sixties while military 
charters still represent a significant proportion of the supplemen-
tal carriers' revenue. 
Similar to the scheduled carriers, the United States charter 
carriers are owned privately. In Europe, although the charter op-
erators are not owned directly by the state, many of them are owned 
by the national carrier which in turn is partially or wholly owned 
by the state. This is a critical issue regarding competition not 
only between charter operators and scheduled airlines in Europe, 
but between United States scheduled and European scheduled carriers. 
In the United States, scheduled airlines have not been allowed to 
own subsidiaries which offer charter services, although they may 
do so themselves. 
Interesting agreements such as these were not always set up 
in Europe. A different, but interesting agreement was formed by the 
major airlines in the united States. In 1959, six U.S. carriers, 
American,Capitol, Eastern, Pan American, TWA and united entered 
into an agreement called the Air Carrier Mutual Aid Pact. 
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This agreement provides for financial assistance in case of a strike. 
The arrangement calls for payment to the struck carrier of any in-
creased "windfall" revenues which they receive as a result of handl-
ing the struck carrier's business less the additional expense of 
handling such increased traffic. In addition. more recently the 
CAB has allowed some carriers to cooperatively restrict capacity 
on certain routes. 
In general the united states policy reflected free trade. This 
has been made fairly clear in the various reports on the U.S. inter-
national air transport policy released in 1963 and 1970. The policy 
was essentially non-protectionist. promoting reasonable rates and 
equal opportunities for U.S. carriers in route exchanges with for-
eign nations. and opposing arbitrary capacity restrictions. Other 
significant recommendations were to retain a balance of U.S flag 
competition on the North Atlantic. have more than one U.S. inter-
national air carrier and oppose pooling agreements with foreign 
carriers. 
In Europe. cooperative agreements regarding maintenance and 
spare parts had begun as early as 1958. with the introduction of 
jet aircraft. Initially SAS and Swissair signed an agreement to 
coordinate equipment policy and pool resources in terms of operat-
ing w9rkshops and technical organizations. By 1969. the agreement 
had been extended to include two other carriers. KLM. and UTA. to 
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form the KSSU group. Under the new program, KLM was to provide air-
frame maintenance for the B-747 and SAS was responsible for the engine 
maintenance. This type of cooperation provides the carrier with a 
small fleet with the advantages of a large fleet. 
One other form of cooperative agreement which is significant 
is the concept of "blocked-space" agreement. Under this concept, 
a developing carrier with insufficient funds to invest in a large 
(leet and to minimize the financial risk involved in purchasing 
aircraft, can block space on another line to be sold under its 
corporate identity. For example, in 1969 Austrian Airlines 
entered into a pool agreement with Sabena to offer service on the 
North Atlantic. Under this scheme, Sabena operated a daily B-707 
flight from Vienna to New York via Brussels. Austrian Airlines 
blocked half of the cargo capacity for its use and paid Sabena half 
the operating costs of the flight, and a fee for each passenger 
handled. The flag carrier of Portugal, TAP, had negotiatied a similar 
blocked space agreement with Alitalia in 1966 to offer service be-
tween Lisbon am New York. 
The mid-sixties not only set the pace for jet operations, but 
also began to focus on the supersonic aircraft. Pan American, BOAC, 
and Air France placed firm orders for the Concorde supersonic air-
craft. Besides these three international air carriers, a U.s. dom-
estic carrier, continental Air Lines, also placed an order for three 
Concorde air,,·raft. In the meantime, two airframe manufacturers and 
two engine manufacturers undertook the design studies on the U.S. SST 
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for the Federal Aviation Agency. The major portion of the cost of re-
search and development was to be borne by the united States Federal Gov-
ernment. Boeing and General Electric were selected to design the united 
States SST. This team won the competition but the project was abandoned 
in 1971 for political, environmental, and socio-economic reasons. 
The mid-sixties once again witnessed a further streamlining of 
the transportation planning process in the united States. The Depart-
ment of Transportation was created to provide total transportation 
planning, policy guidance and protection of public interest with the 
aim of achieving an integrated national transportation system based 
on economic criteria and not modal preferences. Prior to this organ-
ization, there were numerous uncoordinated modally oriented transpor-
tation agencies with virtually non-existent common goals. These 
agencies were generally unstructured and without sufficient authority 
to develop a national transportation system effectively. The Depart-
ment was given the responsibility of coordinating transportation pro-
grams, providing transportation leadership, cooperating and coordinat.-
ing transportation projects with federal, state, and local government 
agencies, and identifying prodigious transportation problems. 
Parallel efforts took place in Canada, where the National Trans-
portation Act of 1967 created the present Canadian Transport Commiss-
ion to coordinate the development, regulation and control of the 
total transportation system; and in the united Kingdom where the Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA) came into being in April of this year (1972) 
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with much the same powers but for aviation only. The functions of 
these Agencies are somewhat similar to those of the united States De-
partment of Transportation as well as the Civil Aeronautics Board. 
In this paper most of the attention has been devoted to the devel-
opment of the air passenger transportation industry. Although the 
growth of air cargo has been very significant in the past, its con-
tribution to the total revenue of the carriers is still fairly small. 
On the average, for all scheduled airlines taken together, approximately 
ten percent of the revenue is derived from air cargo. According to 
8 
one report less than one half of a percent of the total cargo moves 
by air. The same report estimates that if the bulk cargo such as oil, 
coal minerals, etc, is excluded then the share of cargo transported by 
air increases to almost four percent. In the past a large part of the 
air cargo has been emergency cargo. The stable cargo has in the past 
been restricted to goods of high value, fragility and perishability. 
The most crucial factor in air cargo is, of course, the cost. It 
is now a generally accepted fact that roughly half of the cost of 
handling cargo is on the ground: loading, unloading, storing, documen-
tation, etc. Recently, effort has been focused on reducing these ground 
handling costs. 9 For instance, according to one detailed study, a 
typical international shipment requires the preparation and processing 
of an average of 46 documents of which nine involve the carrier directly. 
8. Interavia - Reference 8. 
9. Committee on International Trade Documentation - Reference 9. 
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Efforts to reduce ground handling costs in the past have been in the 
areas of containerization, computerized documentation systems, etc. 
Another critical and unfortunately unsolved problem is in the area of 
rates. So far no carrier or government agency has been able to set 
rates which take into account adequately, the cost, the value and the 
market elements of air cargo. The solutions to these problems will 
expand the air cargo market and its contribution to the total revenue 
of the air transport industry. 
Although direct subsidy is non-existent with major airlines, in-
directly the airlines are still aided a great deal by the governments. 
In most cases, the full cost of navigational and terminal services is 
still not recovered from the air carriers, but supported by national 
and regional governments. Since the Chicago Conference of 1944, much 
work has been done by ICAO to try to coordinate and standardize the 
charges made for airport and their facilities are open to use by any-
one, the governments have had much trouble distinguishing between the 
services offered to different users. As a consequence, it is debat-
able whether the airlines have paid their full way on the ground or 
in the air. 
Recently more accurate allocation of airports and navigational 
costs have become critical issues. In Europe, for example, an organ-
ization called Eurocontrol operates navigational facilities in the 
upper airspace and makes a charge for such services. In the united 
States the Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970 imposed new and in-
creased aviation user charges to be used for expansion and improvement 
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of the airport and airway system. In addition, some airports have 
sought to meet their costs through "head taxes" levied on arriving 
and/or departing passengers. Recently, an agreement .was reached in 
the united States to prohibit such state and local airport head taxes. 
During this relatively short period of roughly sixty years, the 
., 
progress in the commercial air transport industry has been spectacular. 
In 1970, over 300 million passengers were carried by the scheduled 
international and domestic carriers belonging to lATA. Today, the 
operating revenue of the United States airline industry is about ten 
billion dollars. We can expect even greater progress with the forth-
coming supersonic age and the increasing growth of tourism with its 
mass travel implications. 
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